Faster access than browser!Similarities between Consciousness and Mind–body problem
Consciousness and Mind–body problem have 42 things in common (in Unionpedia): Animal consciousness, Chinese room, Cognitive closure (philosophy), Cognitive neuroscience, Coma, Daniel Dennett, Embodied cognition, Epiphenomenalism, Explanatory gap, Free will, General anaesthesia, Glasgow Coma Scale, Hard problem of consciousness, Idealism, Ideasthesia, Immanuel Kant, John Searle, Karl Marx, Karl Popper, Mind, Mind–body dualism, Mindfulness, Minimally conscious state, Monism, Neural correlates of consciousness, Neuropsychology, Neuroscience, Neuroscience of free will, Neutral monism, Persistent vegetative state, ..., Philosophical zombie, Philosophy of mind, Physicalism, Pineal gland, Problem of other minds, Property dualism, René Descartes, Sentience, Thalamus, The Mind's I, Thomas Henry Huxley, Turing test. Expand index (12 more) »
Animal consciousness
Animal consciousness, or animal awareness, is the quality or state of self-awareness within an animal, or of being aware of an external object or something within itself.
Animal consciousness and Consciousness · Animal consciousness and Mind–body problem ·
Chinese room
The Chinese room argument holds that a program cannot give a computer a "mind", "understanding" or "consciousness", regardless of how intelligently or human-like the program may make the computer behave.
Chinese room and Consciousness · Chinese room and Mind–body problem ·
Cognitive closure (philosophy)
In philosophy of science and philosophy of mind, cognitive closure is the proposition that human minds are constitutionally incapable of solving certain perennial philosophical problems.
Cognitive closure (philosophy) and Consciousness · Cognitive closure (philosophy) and Mind–body problem ·
Cognitive neuroscience
The term cognitive neuroscience was coined by George Armitage Miller and Michael Gazzaniga in year 1976.
Cognitive neuroscience and Consciousness · Cognitive neuroscience and Mind–body problem ·
Coma
Coma is a state of unconsciousness in which a person cannot be awaken; fails to respond normally to painful stimuli, light, or sound; lacks a normal wake-sleep cycle; and does not initiate voluntary actions.
Coma and Consciousness · Coma and Mind–body problem ·
Daniel Dennett
Daniel Clement Dennett III (born March 28, 1942) is an American philosopher, writer, and cognitive scientist whose research centers on the philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, and philosophy of biology, particularly as those fields relate to evolutionary biology and cognitive science.
Consciousness and Daniel Dennett · Daniel Dennett and Mind–body problem ·
Embodied cognition
Embodied cognition is the theory that many features of cognition, whether human or otherwise, are shaped by aspects of the entire body of the organism.
Consciousness and Embodied cognition · Embodied cognition and Mind–body problem ·
Epiphenomenalism
Epiphenomenalism is a mind–body philosophy marked by the belief that basic physical events (sense organs, neural impulses, and muscle contractions) are causal with respect to mental events (thought, consciousness, and cognition).
Consciousness and Epiphenomenalism · Epiphenomenalism and Mind–body problem ·
Explanatory gap
In philosophy of mind and consciousness, the explanatory gap is the difficulty that physicalist theories have in explaining how physical properties give rise to the way things feel when they are experienced.
Consciousness and Explanatory gap · Explanatory gap and Mind–body problem ·
Free will
Free will is the ability to choose between different possible courses of action unimpeded.
Consciousness and Free will · Free will and Mind–body problem ·
General anaesthesia
General anaesthesia or general anesthesia (see spelling differences) is a medically induced coma with loss of protective reflexes, resulting from the administration of one or more general anaesthetic agents.
Consciousness and General anaesthesia · General anaesthesia and Mind–body problem ·
Glasgow Coma Scale
The Glasgow coma scale (GCS) is a neurological scale which aims to give a reliable and objective way of recording the conscious state of a person for initial as well as subsequent assessment.
Consciousness and Glasgow Coma Scale · Glasgow Coma Scale and Mind–body problem ·
Hard problem of consciousness
The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining how and why we have qualia or phenomenal experiences—how sensations acquire characteristics, such as colors and tastes.
Consciousness and Hard problem of consciousness · Hard problem of consciousness and Mind–body problem ·
Idealism
In philosophy, idealism is the group of metaphysical philosophies that assert that reality, or reality as humans can know it, is fundamentally mental, mentally constructed, or otherwise immaterial.
Consciousness and Idealism · Idealism and Mind–body problem ·
Ideasthesia
Ideasthesia (alternative spelling ideaesthesia) is defined as a phenomenon in which activations of concepts (inducers) evoke perception-like experiences (concurrents).
Consciousness and Ideasthesia · Ideasthesia and Mind–body problem ·
Immanuel Kant
Immanuel Kant (22 April 1724 – 12 February 1804) was a German philosopher who is a central figure in modern philosophy.
Consciousness and Immanuel Kant · Immanuel Kant and Mind–body problem ·
John Searle
John Rogers Searle (born 31 July 1932) is an American philosopher.
Consciousness and John Searle · John Searle and Mind–body problem ·
Karl Marx
Karl MarxThe name "Karl Heinrich Marx", used in various lexicons, is based on an error.
Consciousness and Karl Marx · Karl Marx and Mind–body problem ·
Karl Popper
Sir Karl Raimund Popper (28 July 1902 – 17 September 1994) was an Austrian-British philosopher and professor.
Consciousness and Karl Popper · Karl Popper and Mind–body problem ·
Mind
The mind is a set of cognitive faculties including consciousness, perception, thinking, judgement, language and memory.
Consciousness and Mind · Mind and Mind–body problem ·
Mind–body dualism
Mind–body dualism, or mind–body duality, is a view in the philosophy of mind that mental phenomena are, in some respects, non-physical,Hart, W.D. (1996) "Dualism", in A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, ed.
Consciousness and Mind–body dualism · Mind–body dualism and Mind–body problem ·
Mindfulness
Mindfulness is the psychological process of bringing one's attention to experiences occurring in the present moment,Mindfulness Training as a Clinical Intervention: A Conceptual and Empirical Review, by Ruth A. Baer, available at http://www.wisebrain.org/papers/MindfulnessPsyTx.pdf which can be developed through the practice of meditation and other training.
Consciousness and Mindfulness · Mind–body problem and Mindfulness ·
Minimally conscious state
A minimally conscious state (MCS) is a disorder of consciousness distinct from persistent vegetative state and locked-in syndrome.
Consciousness and Minimally conscious state · Mind–body problem and Minimally conscious state ·
Monism
Monism attributes oneness or singleness (Greek: μόνος) to a concept e.g., existence.
Consciousness and Monism · Mind–body problem and Monism ·
Neural correlates of consciousness
The neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) constitute the minimal set of neuronal events and mechanisms sufficient for a specific conscious percept.
Consciousness and Neural correlates of consciousness · Mind–body problem and Neural correlates of consciousness ·
Neuropsychology
Neuropsychology is the study of the structure and function of the brain as they relate to specific psychological processes and behaviours.
Consciousness and Neuropsychology · Mind–body problem and Neuropsychology ·
Neuroscience
Neuroscience (or neurobiology) is the scientific study of the nervous system.
Consciousness and Neuroscience · Mind–body problem and Neuroscience ·
Neuroscience of free will
Neuroscience of free will, a part of neurophilosophy, is the study of the interconnections between free will and neuroscience.
Consciousness and Neuroscience of free will · Mind–body problem and Neuroscience of free will ·
Neutral monism
In the philosophy of mind, neutral monism is the view that the mental and the physical are two ways of organizing or describing the same elements, which are themselves "neutral", that is, neither physical nor mental.
Consciousness and Neutral monism · Mind–body problem and Neutral monism ·
Persistent vegetative state
A persistent vegetative state (PVS) is a disorder of consciousness in which patients with severe brain damage are in a state of partial arousal rather than true awareness.
Consciousness and Persistent vegetative state · Mind–body problem and Persistent vegetative state ·
Philosophical zombie
A philosophical zombie or p-zombie in the philosophy of mind and perception is a hypothetical being that from the outside is indistinguishable from a normal human being but lacks conscious experience, qualia, or sentience.
Consciousness and Philosophical zombie · Mind–body problem and Philosophical zombie ·
Philosophy of mind
Philosophy of mind is a branch of philosophy that studies the nature of the mind.
Consciousness and Philosophy of mind · Mind–body problem and Philosophy of mind ·
Physicalism
In philosophy, physicalism is the ontological thesis that "everything is physical", that there is "nothing over and above" the physical, or that everything supervenes on the physical.
Consciousness and Physicalism · Mind–body problem and Physicalism ·
Pineal gland
The pineal gland, also known as the conarium, kônarion or epiphysis cerebri, is a small endocrine gland in the vertebrate brain.
Consciousness and Pineal gland · Mind–body problem and Pineal gland ·
Problem of other minds
The problem of other minds is a philosophical problem traditionally stated as the following epistemological challenge raised by the skeptic: given that I can only observe the behavior of others, how can I know that others have minds? It is a central tenet of the philosophical idea known as solipsism; the notion that for any person only one's own mind is known to exist.
Consciousness and Problem of other minds · Mind–body problem and Problem of other minds ·
Property dualism
Property dualism describes a category of positions in the philosophy of mind which hold that, although the world is composed of just one kind of substance—the physical kind—there exist two distinct kinds of properties: physical properties and mental properties.
Consciousness and Property dualism · Mind–body problem and Property dualism ·
René Descartes
René Descartes (Latinized: Renatus Cartesius; adjectival form: "Cartesian"; 31 March 1596 – 11 February 1650) was a French philosopher, mathematician, and scientist.
Consciousness and René Descartes · Mind–body problem and René Descartes ·
Sentience
Sentience is the capacity to feel, perceive or experience subjectively.
Consciousness and Sentience · Mind–body problem and Sentience ·
Thalamus
The thalamus (from Greek θάλαμος, "chamber") is the large mass of gray matter in the dorsal part of the diencephalon of the brain with several functions such as relaying of sensory signals, including motor signals, to the cerebral cortex, and the regulation of consciousness, sleep, and alertness.
Consciousness and Thalamus · Mind–body problem and Thalamus ·
The Mind's I
The Mind's I: Fantasies and reflections on self and soul is a 1981 collection of essays and other texts about the nature of the mind and the self, edited with commentary by popular science writers Douglas R. Hofstadter and Daniel C. Dennett.
Consciousness and The Mind's I · Mind–body problem and The Mind's I ·
Thomas Henry Huxley
Thomas Henry Huxley (4 May 1825 – 29 June 1895) was an English biologist specialising in comparative anatomy.
Consciousness and Thomas Henry Huxley · Mind–body problem and Thomas Henry Huxley ·
Turing test
The Turing test, developed by Alan Turing in 1950, is a test of a machine's ability to exhibit intelligent behavior equivalent to, or indistinguishable from, that of a human.
Consciousness and Turing test · Mind–body problem and Turing test ·
The list above answers the following questions
- What Consciousness and Mind–body problem have in common
- What are the similarities between Consciousness and Mind–body problem
Consciousness and Mind–body problem Comparison
Consciousness has 283 relations, while Mind–body problem has 112. As they have in common 42, the Jaccard index is 10.63% = 42 / (283 + 112).
References
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