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Moral skepticism

Index Moral skepticism

Moral skepticism (or moral scepticism) is a class of metaethical theories all members of which entail that no one has any moral knowledge. [1]

39 relations: Aenesidemus, Agnosticism, Amorality, Basil Blackwell, Cambridge University Press, Class (philosophy), Conspiracy theory, David Hume, Edward N. Zalta, Emotivism, Expressivism, Friedrich Nietzsche, Gilbert Harman, Harvard University Press, Is–ought problem, J. L. Mackie, James Flynn (academic), John E. Hare, Logical consequence, Max Stirner, Meta-ethics, Michael Ruse, MIT Press, Modal logic, Moral nihilism, Moral realism, Moral relativism, Non-cognitivism, Oxford University Press, Paranoia, Perspectivism, Psychological determinism, Pyrrho, Pyrrhonism, Richard Joyce (philosopher), Sextus Empiricus, Truth-apt, Universal prescriptivism, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong.

Aenesidemus

Aenesidemus (Αἰνησίδημος or Αἰνεσίδημος) was a Greek Pyrrhonist philosopher, born in Knossos on the island of Crete.

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Agnosticism

Agnosticism is the view that the existence of God, of the divine or the supernatural is unknown or unknowable.

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Amorality

Amorality is an absence of, indifference towards, or disregard for morality.

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Basil Blackwell

Sir Basil Henry Blackwell (29 May 18899 April 1984) was born in Oxford, England.

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Cambridge University Press

Cambridge University Press (CUP) is the publishing business of the University of Cambridge.

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Class (philosophy)

In at least one source, a class is a set in which an individual member can be recognized in one or both of two ways: a) it is included in an extensional definition of the whole set (a list of set members) b) it matches an Intensional definition of one set member. By contrast, a "type" is an intensional definition; it is a description that is sufficiently generalized to fit every member of a set. Philosophers sometimes distinguish classes from types and kinds. We can talk about the class of human beings, just as we can talk about the type (or natural kind), human being, or humanity. How, then, might classes differ from types? One might well think they are not actually different categories of being, but typically, while both are treated as abstract objects, classes are not usually treated as universals, whereas types usually are. Whether natural kinds ought to be considered universals is vexed; see natural kind. There is, in any case, a difference in how we talk about types or kinds. We say that Socrates is a token of a type, or an instance of the natural kind, human being. But notice that we say instead that Socrates is a member of the class of human beings. We would not say that Socrates is a "member" of the type or kind, human beings. Nor would we say he is a type (or kind) of a class. He is a token (instance) of the type (kind). So the linguistic difference is: types (or kinds) have tokens (or instances); classes, on the other hand, have members. The concept of a class is similar to the concept of a set defined by its members. Here, the class is extensional. If, however, a set is defined intensionally, then it is a set of things that meet some requirement to be a member. Thus, such a set can be seen as creating a type. Note that it also creates a class from the extension of the intensional set. A type always has a corresponding class (though that class might have no members), but a class does not necessarily have a corresponding type.

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Conspiracy theory

A conspiracy theory is an explanation of an event or situation that invokes an unwarranted conspiracy, generally one involving an illegal or harmful act carried out by government or other powerful actors.

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David Hume

David Hume (born David Home; 7 May 1711 NS (26 April 1711 OS) – 25 August 1776) was a Scottish philosopher, historian, economist, and essayist, who is best known today for his highly influential system of philosophical empiricism, skepticism, and naturalism.

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Edward N. Zalta

Edward N. Zalta (born March 16, 1952) is a senior research scholar at the Center for the Study of Language and Information.

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Emotivism

Emotivism is a meta-ethical view that claims that ethical sentences do not express propositions but emotional attitudes.

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Expressivism

Expressivism in meta-ethics is a theory about the meaning of moral language.

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Friedrich Nietzsche

Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (15 October 1844 – 25 August 1900) was a German philosopher, cultural critic, composer, poet, philologist and a Latin and Greek scholar whose work has exerted a profound influence on Western philosophy and modern intellectual history.

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Gilbert Harman

Gilbert Harman (born 1938) is an American philosopher, who taught at Princeton University from 1963 until his retirement in 2017.

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Harvard University Press

Harvard University Press (HUP) is a publishing house established on January 13, 1913, as a division of Harvard University, and focused on academic publishing.

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Is–ought problem

The is–ought problem, as articulated by Scottish philosopher and historian David Hume (1711–76), states that many writers make claims about what ought to be, based on statements about what is.

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J. L. Mackie

John Leslie Mackie (25 August 1917 – 12 December 1981) was an Australian philosopher, originally from Sydney.

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James Flynn (academic)

James Robert Flynn FRSNZ (born 1934) is a New Zealand intelligence researcher.

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John E. Hare

John Edmund Hare (born 26 July 1949) is a British classicist, philosopher, ethicist, and currently Noah Porter Professor of Philosophical Theology at Yale University.

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Logical consequence

Logical consequence (also entailment) is a fundamental concept in logic, which describes the relationship between statements that hold true when one statement logically follows from one or more statements.

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Max Stirner

Johann Kaspar Schmidt (October 25, 1806 – June 26, 1856), better known as Max Stirner, was a German philosopher who is often seen as one of the forerunners of nihilism, existentialism, psychoanalytic theory, postmodernism and individualist anarchism.

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Meta-ethics

Meta-ethics is the branch of ethics that seeks to understand the nature of ethical properties, statements, attitudes, and judgments.

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Michael Ruse

Michael Ruse, (born 21 June 1940) is a philosopher of science who specializes in the philosophy of biology and works on the relationship between science and religion, the creation–evolution controversy, and the demarcation problem within science.

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MIT Press

The MIT Press is a university press affiliated with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in Cambridge, Massachusetts (United States).

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Modal logic

Modal logic is a type of formal logic primarily developed in the 1960s that extends classical propositional and predicate logic to include operators expressing modality.

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Moral nihilism

Moral nihilism (also known as ethical nihilism or the error theory) is the meta-ethical view that nothing is morally right or wrong.

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Moral realism

Moral realism (also ethical realism or moral Platonism) is the position that ethical sentences express propositions that refer to objective features of the world (that is, features independent of subjective opinion), some of which may be true to the extent that they report those features accurately.

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Moral relativism

Moral relativism may be any of several philosophical positions concerned with the differences in moral judgments across different people and cultures.

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Non-cognitivism

Non-cognitivism is the meta-ethical view that ethical sentences do not express propositions (i.e., statements) and thus cannot be true or false (they are not truth-apt).

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Oxford University Press

Oxford University Press (OUP) is the largest university press in the world, and the second oldest after Cambridge University Press.

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Paranoia

Paranoia is an instinct or thought process believed to be heavily influenced by anxiety or fear, often to the point of delusion and irrationality.

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Perspectivism

Perspectivism (Perspektivismus) is the philosophical view (touched upon as far back as Plato's rendition of Protagoras) that all ideations take place from particular perspectives, and that there are many possible conceptual schemes, or perspectives in which judgment of truth or value can be made.

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Psychological determinism

Daniel Bader discusses two forms of psychological determinism.

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Pyrrho

Pyrrho of Elis (Pyrron ho Eleios) was a Greek philosopher of Classical antiquity and is credited as being the first Greek skeptic philosopher.

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Pyrrhonism

Pyrrhonism was a school of skepticism founded by Pyrrho in the fourth century BC.

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Richard Joyce (philosopher)

Richard Joyce (born 1966) is a British-Australian-New Zealand philosopher, known for his contributions to the fields of meta-ethics and moral psychology.

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Sextus Empiricus

Sextus Empiricus (Σέξτος Ἐμπειρικός; c. 160 – c. 210 CE, n.b., dates uncertain), was a physician and philosopher, who likely lived in Alexandria, Rome, or Athens.

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Truth-apt

In philosophy, to say that a statement is truth-apt is to say that it could be uttered in some context (without its meaning being altered) and would then express a true or false proposition.

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Universal prescriptivism

Universal prescriptivism (often simply called prescriptivism) is the meta-ethical view which claims that, rather than expressing propositions, ethical sentences function similarly to imperatives which are universalizable—whoever makes a moral judgment is committed to the same judgment in any situation where the same relevant facts obtain.

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Walter Sinnott-Armstrong

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (born 1955) is an American philosopher.

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Redirects here:

Ethical skepticism, Moral Error Theory, Moral error theory, Moral scepticism.

References

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_skepticism

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