Faster access than browser!Similarities between Analytic philosophy and Expressivism
Analytic philosophy and Expressivism have 11 things in common (in Unionpedia): A. J. Ayer, Charles Stevenson, Emotivism, G. E. Moore, Gottlob Frege, Kantianism, Logical positivism, Meta-ethics, Non-cognitivism, R. M. Hare, Universal prescriptivism.
A. J. Ayer
Sir Alfred Jules "Freddie" Ayer, FBA (29 October 1910 – 27 June 1989), usually cited as A. J. Ayer, was a British philosopher known for his promotion of logical positivism, particularly in his books Language, Truth, and Logic (1936) and The Problem of Knowledge (1956).
A. J. Ayer and Analytic philosophy · A. J. Ayer and Expressivism ·
Charles Stevenson
Charles Leslie Stevenson (June 27, 1908 – March 14, 1979) was an American analytic philosopher best known for his work in ethics and aesthetics. Stevenson was educated at Yale, receiving in 1930 a B.A. in English literature, at Cambridge where in 1933 he was awarded a B.A. in philosophy, and at Harvard, getting his Ph.D. there in 1935. He was a professor at Yale University from 1939 to 1946, but was denied tenure because of his defense of emotivism. He then taught at the University of Michigan from 1946 to 1977. He studied in England with Wittgenstein and G. E. Moore. Among his students was Joel Feinberg. He gave the most sophisticated defense of emotivism in the post-war period. In his papers "The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms" (1937) and "Persuasive Definitions" (1938), and his book Ethics and Language (1944), he developed a theory of emotive meaning; which he then used to provide a foundation for his theory of a persuasive definition. He furthermore advanced emotivism as a meta-ethical theory that sharply delineated between cognitive, scientific uses of language (used to state facts and to give reasons, and subject to the laws of science) and non-cognitive uses (used to state feelings and exercise influence).
Analytic philosophy and Charles Stevenson · Charles Stevenson and Expressivism ·
Emotivism
Emotivism is a meta-ethical view that claims that ethical sentences do not express propositions but emotional attitudes.
Analytic philosophy and Emotivism · Emotivism and Expressivism ·
G. E. Moore
George Edward Moore (4 November 1873 – 24 October 1958), usually cited as G. E. Moore, was an English philosopher.
Analytic philosophy and G. E. Moore · Expressivism and G. E. Moore ·
Gottlob Frege
Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob Frege (8 November 1848 – 26 July 1925) was a German philosopher, logician, and mathematician.
Analytic philosophy and Gottlob Frege · Expressivism and Gottlob Frege ·
Kantianism
Kantianism is the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, a German philosopher born in Königsberg, Prussia (now Kaliningrad, Russia).
Analytic philosophy and Kantianism · Expressivism and Kantianism ·
Logical positivism
Logical positivism and logical empiricism, which together formed neopositivism, was a movement in Western philosophy whose central thesis was verificationism, a theory of knowledge which asserted that only statements verifiable through empirical observation are cognitively meaningful.
Analytic philosophy and Logical positivism · Expressivism and Logical positivism ·
Meta-ethics
Meta-ethics is the branch of ethics that seeks to understand the nature of ethical properties, statements, attitudes, and judgments.
Analytic philosophy and Meta-ethics · Expressivism and Meta-ethics ·
Non-cognitivism
Non-cognitivism is the meta-ethical view that ethical sentences do not express propositions (i.e., statements) and thus cannot be true or false (they are not truth-apt).
Analytic philosophy and Non-cognitivism · Expressivism and Non-cognitivism ·
R. M. Hare
Richard Mervyn Hare (21 March 1919 – 29 January 2002), usually cited as R. M. Hare, was an English moral philosopher who held the post of White's Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Oxford from 1966 until 1983.
Analytic philosophy and R. M. Hare · Expressivism and R. M. Hare ·
Universal prescriptivism
Universal prescriptivism (often simply called prescriptivism) is the meta-ethical view which claims that, rather than expressing propositions, ethical sentences function similarly to imperatives which are universalizable—whoever makes a moral judgment is committed to the same judgment in any situation where the same relevant facts obtain.
Analytic philosophy and Universal prescriptivism · Expressivism and Universal prescriptivism ·
The list above answers the following questions
- What Analytic philosophy and Expressivism have in common
- What are the similarities between Analytic philosophy and Expressivism
Analytic philosophy and Expressivism Comparison
Analytic philosophy has 222 relations, while Expressivism has 33. As they have in common 11, the Jaccard index is 4.31% = 11 / (222 + 33).
References
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