Faster access than browser!Similarities between Fact–value distinction and Naturalistic fallacy
Fact–value distinction and Naturalistic fallacy have 7 things in common (in Unionpedia): A Treatise of Human Nature, Arthur Prior, David Hume, G. E. Moore, Is–ought problem, Moral realism, Moralistic fallacy.
A Treatise of Human Nature
A Treatise of Human Nature (1738–40) is a book by Scottish philosopher David Hume, considered by many to be Hume's most important work and one of the most influential works in the history of philosophy.
A Treatise of Human Nature and Fact–value distinction · A Treatise of Human Nature and Naturalistic fallacy ·
Arthur Prior
Arthur Norman Prior (4 December 1914 – 6 October 1969), usually cited as A. N. Prior, was a noted logician and philosopher.
Arthur Prior and Fact–value distinction · Arthur Prior and Naturalistic fallacy ·
David Hume
David Hume (born David Home; 7 May 1711 NS (26 April 1711 OS) – 25 August 1776) was a Scottish philosopher, historian, economist, and essayist, who is best known today for his highly influential system of philosophical empiricism, skepticism, and naturalism.
David Hume and Fact–value distinction · David Hume and Naturalistic fallacy ·
G. E. Moore
George Edward Moore (4 November 1873 – 24 October 1958), usually cited as G. E. Moore, was an English philosopher.
Fact–value distinction and G. E. Moore · G. E. Moore and Naturalistic fallacy ·
Is–ought problem
The is–ought problem, as articulated by Scottish philosopher and historian David Hume (1711–76), states that many writers make claims about what ought to be, based on statements about what is.
Fact–value distinction and Is–ought problem · Is–ought problem and Naturalistic fallacy ·
Moral realism
Moral realism (also ethical realism or moral Platonism) is the position that ethical sentences express propositions that refer to objective features of the world (that is, features independent of subjective opinion), some of which may be true to the extent that they report those features accurately.
Fact–value distinction and Moral realism · Moral realism and Naturalistic fallacy ·
Moralistic fallacy
The moralistic fallacy is the informal fallacy of assuming that an aspect of nature which has socially unpleasant consequences cannot exist.
Fact–value distinction and Moralistic fallacy · Moralistic fallacy and Naturalistic fallacy ·
The list above answers the following questions
- What Fact–value distinction and Naturalistic fallacy have in common
- What are the similarities between Fact–value distinction and Naturalistic fallacy
Fact–value distinction and Naturalistic fallacy Comparison
Fact–value distinction has 34 relations, while Naturalistic fallacy has 42. As they have in common 7, the Jaccard index is 9.21% = 7 / (34 + 42).
References
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